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Abstract 
 
The European Union has adopted transparent competitive tendering as compulsory 
governance mechanism for all public procurement within the Union in order to enlighten 
the principle declaration of non discrimination in the Union. The choice of competition 
was also explained by the desire to discourage corruption as it has been defended in the 
literature (Di Tella et al., 1997). However competition can raise transaction costs (such as 
quality opportunism) if quality is difficult to measure or monitor (Heide, 1994; Buvik et 
al., 2001). That is for example the case when public authority buys experience 
goods/services such as health service, defense contracts, or transport services. For those 
public goods, it has been noticed the difficulty for authority to verify ex-post accurately 
that the contractor has fulfilled the contracted quality.  
Relational buying mechanisms may be effective to cope with such opportunism (Buvik et 
al., 2000; Laing et al., 2004). As such mechanisms are forbidden in public buying by the 
regulation, some authors such as Laffont &Tirole (1993) claimed that the design of 
appropriate enforcement mechanisms embedded in public contract tendering can help 
overcome the quality opportunism suspected to such goods/services. They have further 
elaborated a rosary of incentives to deal with the particular quality opportunism of 
experience good.  
Which effective quality incentives exist for experience goods or services, and how are 
these implemented in practice to boost quality commitment? That is the question which 
guides this paper. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This chapter headed as introduction encompasses the study background, research 
problem, and the purpose and significance of the study.  
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
The European Economic Community (EEC) members have taken further steps in the 
declaration of their community and non-discrimination of nationality principles. It has 
been pointed out that public procurement practices in country members aiming at 
preferring local goods and services in their buying decisions were contradictory to those 
principles. It was then important for the community to cope with those practices by 
engaging fundamental reforms in their national procurement policies. From now on, 
European governments and their related organizations are forced to carry out fair 
competitive tendering each time purchased good values reach a defined threshold.  
 
The EEC claimed that a fair competitive tendering will be profitable for country 
members through the benefits of aggressive competition. With fair competition which 
can be interpreted as a transparent, non-discriminated and open competition (in some 
cases), public contracts will be awarded to the most effective suppliers. As well, market 
is currently challenged by permanent innovative opportunities which lead supply toward 
better quality at less cost. Therefore the extension of market size at the European level 
would produce better results. 
 
And now the obligation to tender in public procurement when the threshold is reached, 
is widely implemented within the EEC. In Norway, the regulation 2006-04-07 nr 402 
has made compulsory all public buying reaching the threshold defined by the EEC. That 
regulation concerns all public buying at the central government level or at the local level 
(Fylket, Kommune, Autonomous public institutions). However, competitive tendering 
for the purchasing of certain goods is being challenged by substantial transaction costs, 
especially for experience goods. The selected supplier may not have the right 
competence to fulfil the contract specifications, or may behave opportunistically ex-post 
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by supplying a quality below the contracted quality level since his quality performances 
are generally difficult to monitor for such goods. That is why many authors are claiming 
that competitive tendering may not be the adequate governance structure for experience 
goods. Other voices under protest argue however that competition may show strong 
positive results (on cost and quality) if enforcement mechanisms are provided to 
supplier.  
  
1.2 Research problem 
 
Enforcement mechanisms embedded in public contract tendering can help overcome the 
quality opportunism suspected to suppliers of experience good. That is a statement that 
authors such as Laffont and Tirole (1993) claimed under protest. They have further 
elaborated a rosary of incentives to deal with the particular quality opportunism of 
experience good.  
Which effective quality incentives exist for experience goods or services, and how are 
these implemented in practice to boost quality commitment? That is the question which 
guides this paper. 
 
1.3 Statement of purpose and significance 
 
This paper explores the effective quality incentives mitigating the quality opportunism 
on experience goods and services in public contract which are suggested by theory 
pioneers such as Laffont and Tirole (1993). We will try to investigate as well how these 
incentives are implemented in day-to-day public procurement practice in Norway.  
 
Public procurement in Norway reached NOK 260 billions in 2004 (Ødegård, 2006). 
That was about 15% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For such high 
weight in the country’s GDP, there is no doubt that the effectiveness of public expenses 
in Norway would have a great influence on wealth creation. Effectiveness here is 
reached when suppliers for public services and goods provides the right quality at the 
right costs. Also because a big part of these public expenses are devoted to acquire 
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experience goods and services (transport, health service, defence), the quality 
opportunism suspected on such goods and services put a great potential risk on wealth 
creation in Norway by threatening the effectiveness of these expenses. The design of 
appropriate incentives coping with that opportunism will lead to public expenses 
effectiveness, and thus will boost wealth creation in Norway. This is where the practical 
interest of this study is revealed. 
   
When reviewing the literature on public procurement, it appears that a wide number of 
researches have been done to suggest positive (which should provide desirable results) 
enforcement mechanisms to reach quality expectation (Laffont &Tirole, 1993; Kjerstad, 
2000). However, it is few researches done to investigate how well are those understood 
at the implementation stage by public procurement practitioners, especially in the 
Norwegian public procurement. The uniqueness of this paper is to fill up such 
theoretical gap. 
 
With focus on public contract specifications, we will explore the incentives suggested 
by Laffont & Tirole (1993) and other Incentives Theory (IT) pioneers to deal with 
quality opportunism in public contracts in Norway. We will investigate their 
implementation in public buying practices in Norway. 
 
The remaining of the study will define quality as it is apprehended in this paper, then 
follows the theoretical part of this paper reviewing the effective quality incentives 
suggested by authors such as Laffont & Tirole. Empirical evidences will be shown 
thereafter to explore the potential of quality opportunism on the specified quality and 
the practical implementations of incentives to mitigate these quality risks. We will end 
up by discussing the effectiveness of the implemented incentives. 
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2. Quality definition of experience good 
 
Experience goods are considered as goods whose quality is observed by procurer only 
after purchase, and/or difficult to verify ex-post contract (Laffont & Tirole, 1993). 
Experience goods can also be defined as goods whose quality is observed by users but 
not easily verified by procurer who write the contract. In both cases, experience goods 
contracts are subjected to high quality uncertainty.  
 
In the public sector, experience goods concern the utilities, the defense services, health 
service and transport services. Those services are generally supplied through franchise 
contracts. The procurement of theses services occurs first and the quality is observed ex-
post purchasing by users as they experience the supply quality (during the usage). An 
example can be when users of electical power supply observe the quality during the 
usage. 
 
Indeed, the quality of experience goods or services is about how users is satisfied. Users 
satisfaction depends on how the supply meets or exceeds his expectation. It requires 
from the supplier to know exactly the actual needs of customer. However, customers’ 
needs evolve as time is running. Explicitly, the needs of customers yesterday are not de-
facto the same today. The latter suggests that users’ perception of quality depends on 
how well the supplier anticipes the future needs of his customers. As Evans (2005) 
stated: 
 
Quality is a race without a finish line. (p. 11). 
 
From the above statement, it appears clear that quality should be envisaged in a 
continuous improvements perspective. The following improvements can specially be 
fostered to supply better quality for experience goods: 
 
o Customer service and quality improvement: Customer services referrs to all the 
activities designed to enhance customer satisfaction. in other words, it includes all 
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activities helping to know the customer and his actual and future quality needs, as well 
as activities usefull for responding to customer expectation. 
 
o Organization management improvement: It is important that supplier aligns all 
his internal capabilities and abilities so as to meet customers needs at any point of time. 
By internal capability and ability, it is meant the human asset (or the social capital) and 
the technical asset (physical investments).  
 
As it can be seen above, quality in public buying of experience goods or services is not 
easy for public procurer to control because it involves more than the service specified to 
be delivered (even internal management is concerned for better quality). That lack of 
control over quality increases the risk that the supplier does not supply the contracted 
quality. Quality commitments devices should then be designed for supplier of 
experience goods.  
 
3. Theory and litterature review  
 
3.1 Agency theory 
 
Principal-Agent theory (PAT) or agency theory (AT) explores the relationship between 
a principal or a buyer who contracts with an agent or a seller for the supply of a goods 
or a service (Buvik & Rokkan, 2003). In such contract, it can be possible that the 
principal and the agent have divergent interests (conflicting interest)1. Such divergence 
of interests can lead to moral hazard and adverse selection.  
 
The moral hazard referrs to contractor’s discretionary actions not observed by the buyer 
and which can however influence the contract costs and quality. Example of moral 
hazard is the supply of a quality level lower than the contracted level (when the action 
cannot be observed by buyer) in the desire to save costs. Adverse selection as for it is 
about the exclusive or private information possessed by the contractor and which is not 
                                               
1
 The principal can target quality while the agent wants to save costs (less effort) 
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available (or not observable) to buyer. The agent can hide such private information in 
order to derive substantial information rents from it. Classical example of adverse 
selection is a smoking person who hides the  information that he smokes (his private 
information) in order to pay an insurrance price lower than the one reflecting the 
premium risk paid by all smokers before they get insurred.  
 
Agency theory proposes that the principal invests in monitoring tools to gather 
information on agent actions, and/or initiates [the principal] a contract which aligns both 
interests (principal and agent) so as to reach the desired goal (quality expectation in this 
case). Two types of contract are then available for such purpose: behaviour-based 
contract and outcome-based contract (Buvik et al., 2003).  
The behavioural-based contracts emphasize on the level of risk beared by the agent as a 
a tool to solve the moral hazard issue. According to such contract, the agent tend to have 
a high powered incentive to supply a better quality (high effort) if the principal can 
design a contract so that he (the agent) bears a high financial risk. An example is a 
public Build Operate Transfert (BOT) contract  without any subsidy. In such contract, 
the agent (private operator) can only cover his operation costs from his sales revenue. 
Consequently, that agent will have a high incentive to provide good quality especially if 
quality and demand are complemantory. The issue to put all the financial risk on the 
agent is that the agent can charge a high risk premium (high price) for the high risk if he 
is risk averse (Douma &Schreuder, 2002). The theory supposes that the agent is risk 
averse while the principal is risk neutral. The idea is that the principal is supposed to be 
bigger in size, and therefore can diversify his risk to different portfolio of investments 
(Douma &Schreuder, 2005). As an alternative to the cost of risk bore by the agent, it is 
argued that the principal can give a quality incentive to the agent. The problem for the 
principal becomes then a design of reward structure which trades off between having 
the agent bears more risk and giving him incentives (Douma & Schreuder, 2002). The 
best solution is to have the principal sharing in the risk bore by the agent by designing a 
reward structure depending on the payoff (outcome quality) but also containing fixed 
element independent of such outcome. 
Outcome-based contract as for it seeks to explain that the principal can discourage the 
quality opportunism by specifying in the much details possible the expected quality 
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while providing key performance indicators for effective monitoring (Stanley & 
Hensher, 2008). If outcome-based contract can be of help, it can however show its 
weakness if quality complexity or uncertainty is very high. In fact, service such as 
health or defence services are difficult to predict because of their high uncertainty 
(Laing, 2004; Parker, 2003). That is why outcome-based contract should consider 
flexibility so as to facilitate adjustments or modifications involved by the uncertainty. 
 
In defintive, public buyer may align the three mechanisms, namely information 
gathering, outcome-based contract and behavioural-based contract for better results. 
Such designs assotiated with appropriate incentives designs can be effective to eliminate 
quality opportunism. 
 
3.2 Incentives Theory (IT) 
 
Derived from principal-agent theory (PAT) and game theory, incentives theory is 
concerned about the sensitivity of the power of optimal incentive schemes to changes in 
factors such as uncertainty, product market competition, quality concerns, bidding 
competition, dynamics and collusion (Laffont &Tirole, 1993) (p. xviii).  
 
In the previous section it has been explained that moral hazard and adverse selection  
can negatively affect the targeted quality. We also pointed out that gathering 
information on supplier’s actions may help overcome these risks. Information gathering 
incurrs however additional costs. Incentives theory seeks to create effective (powerful) 
alternative mechanisms to replace the needs  to gather information, thus avoiding the 
incurred costs while meeting quality expectations. In other words IT tries to design 
alternative mechanisms able to mitigate monitoring costs (for example self-
enforcements devices) while commiting supplier to his quality obligations. 
 
Incentives theory is of interest in public procurement. In fact, experience good contracts 
in the public sector are usually awarded through competitive tenderings for certain 
duration, all of which secure high market power to contractor (franchise bidding). The 
high market power can encourage public contractor to behave as a monopolist. It has 
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been pointed out that monopolists supply usually poor quality when they are not 
regulated (Essig & Batran, 2005). The design of quality incentives can be used as 
regulatory tools. 
 
3.3 Quality incentives and experience goods 
 
Moral hazard and adverse selection have desastrous effect on quality in public 
procurement. As it has been developped above, most of public contracts concern 
experience goods and the potential of adverse selection for such goods is high at the 
contract awarding stage. Because  supply occurs after purchased, the selected supplier 
may lack the required competences to supply the targeted quality. However competence 
is a private information for supplier (he knows better his own technology and capability 
than does buyer). As well, the issue of moral hazard is linked to the fact that the supply 
of quality increases usually the supplier’s costs. Laffont and Tirole (1993) stated 
accordingly: 
 
In the case of experience goods, we argue that incentives to supply quality and those to 
reduce costs are inherent in conflicts.(p. 213) 
 
According to this statement, quality supply involves additional costs such as 
investments costs. Nevertheless, private supplier in public contract has the prime 
interest to maximize his profits. The supplier can therefore behave opportunistically by 
taking discretionary actions to deteriorate the contracted quality level (cheaper materials 
to derive rents) since such actions are difficult to detect in experience good contract. 
The idea is that quality is the ideal candidate for such opportunism than is cost. The 
latter is observable and easily verifiable through open-book agreements (Bajari, 2001). 
Incentives must then be provided so as to commit the contractor to his quality obligation 
(conformance to contract). Such incentives named as quality incentives must be 
carefully designed because they can generate some distortions which result in term in 
substantial costs (Kjerstad et al., 2000; Bajari et al., 2001).  
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The litterature in incentives theory has suggested various optimal quality devices. Those 
optimal or effective quality devices are considered to achieve both quality target and 
fair costs. 
 
Based on the works of Laffont & Tirole (1993), Kjerstad et al. (2000), Vickerman 
(2004), Osmundsen et al. (2008), and Bajari (2001)  the following table summarizes the 
litterature on effective quality incentives schemes 
Adverse selection Screening incentives/ 
Monitoring and sanction incentives 
 
Competition and comparison incentives 
Contract price 
Contract duration 
Sub-contract coordination mechanism 
Sales incentives 
Qu
al
ity
 
in
ce
n
tiv
es
 
 
 
 
 
Moral Harzard 
Reputation incentives 
Table 1: Summary of main quality incentives 
 
3.4 Implementation of Optimal Quality incentives for experience 
goods 
 
3.4.1 Screening incentives 
 
Screening incentives are those that public procuror provides at the selection level to 
ensure future quality supply. They are designated to gather critical information on 
supplier’s capabilities, and on market (to formulate accurately the quality 
specifications). 
Public authorities may reduce the asymmetric information poblem by gathering market 
information (available technology, development). A tool to achieve that is competitive 
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dialogue2 (Essig & Batran, 2005). Competitive dialogue is meant to investigate more 
closely the competences available at potential suppliers’ side. During the competitive 
dialogue public procurer has the opportunity to have an insight on alternative supplies 
available, and thus can benchmarked those alternatives to addresse more accurately his 
quality expectations. Competitive dialogue is benefitial when the quality is very 
important in the contract but is difficult to formulate because of its high complexity.   
When competitive dialogue is not used, public procuror may require ex-ante contract 
from bidders to declare their plan/strategy or policy which enlightens how they will 
fulfill the specified quality. By doing so information on supply candidate’s competences 
can be extracted.   
 
Fee or guarantee payments are other effectives devices to extract private information 
from seller at the selection level. Kjerstad & Vagstad (2000) explained that fee payment 
is optimal where the risk of information rent is high because it involves self-selection 
devices (discourage unserious bidders). However it may keep away efficient bidders 
from bidding if the fee is not chosen carefully in a way to leave enough rent for those 
bidders. Optimality of fee incentive will come from their careful choice.  
 
Self selection devices, other aspects of screening incentives can be given to unserious 
bidders through a detailed specification of quality. In fact, unserious bidders or hit-and-
run bidders may avoid entry if they know that quality opportunism will be easy to detect 
through effective monitoring devices. That is that the buyer can give a strong signal to 
unserious bidders that he knows exactly the quality to be delivered. For example 
through learning by doing, the buyer can develop effective key performance indicators 
(KPI) to be described in the bid in order to measure future quality performances of 
operator. Those KPI serving as monitoring devices may discourage hit-and-run 
companies as the quality performances of the latter would be accurately assessed 
through the benchmark against those KPI (Hensher et al., 2008). The accuracy of such 
quality measurement can be increased by using advanced technological tools. With the 
technological development present in today’s business, it is possible to acquire 
monitoring tools which can provide real-time data (GSM, GPS, RFID) on how the 
                                               
2
 Competitive dialogue is a competition coupled with negotiation 
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contract is executed.  When such tools are possible to acquire, monitoring becomes 
effective (accuracy in KPI measurement) and the design of sanction schemes or 
coercive incentives to punish any contracted-quality break can provide quality 
incentives to supplier. Coercive incentives can be for example financial (monetary 
compensations for poor quality), or can be a pure cancellation of the contract. In such 
case, the potential of adverse selection and further moral hazard will be reduced 
significantly.  
3.4.2  Competition  as quality incentive 
 
The design of outcome-based contract to control the negative effect of information 
asymmetry on quality could be successful if comparative outcome-performances exist. 
Comparative performances suppose that it exists alternative supply sources whose 
performances can be benchmarked against the contractor’s outcome.  To say it 
differently, competition (presence of alternative supply source) can be an effective 
motivation for public contractor to provide quality. As Laffont & Tirole (1993) (p.211) 
claimed:  
 
Second, the possiblity of non-renewal of a regulatory license [public contract], of 
second sourcing [alternative supply source], of deregulation [competition], or of 
missing future sales-contingent rewards makes the regulated firm concerned about its 
reputation as a supplier of quality.  
  
Increased competition (high number of alternatives supply sources) may help overcome 
the negative impact of moral hazard and avderse selection on quality supply. However, 
the quality effectiveness of competition is not secured right away. Competition can lead 
to corruption, market concentration and collusion, which in turn limit the positive 
benefits of competition on quality (De Silva et al., 2009; Amaral et al., 2008; Solvoll et 
al., 2008; Alessanderson et al., 2006). It is then the responsibility of public procurer to 
take appropriate actions so as to increase the effectiveness of competition as quality 
incentive.  
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For example market entry influences strongly the market structure (concentration or few 
competitors). Solvoll and Mathisen (2008) have enlighted how the tendency of market 
concentration in the bus industry in Norway hinders increased competition, and thus 
limits its quality advantages. The procurer can fight against concentration or oligopoly  
by removing the barriers which limit entry. Information advantage of incumbent vis-à-
vis other competitors (De Silva et al., 2009) is among such barriers. Incumbent has 
usually more information about costs, technology, competences (through learning by 
doing) than entrant competitors since the first has been supplying the good in previous 
contract.  
Such information disadvantage of entrants can in term keep them out of business and 
thus deteriorate quality through market contraction and collusion. Explictly, information 
disadvantage of entrant can lead to the winner’s curse3 which can generate  bankrupty at 
the end. The winner’s curse can occur to incumbent as well if there is high uncertainty 
in the bid, all of wich can increase the risk of quality opportunism derived from the lack 
of information for both incumbent and entrants. De Silva et al. (2009) advise that the 
release of information critical for bidders (engineering costs, technical information) in 
the bidding process can help mitigate the winner’s curse and in term keep competitors 
on track (in business) for better competition.  
 
Transparency in the award procedure is also a strategy to foster competition by 
eliminating corruption for example. It is clear that corruption is a parasite of quality. Di 
Tella (1997) understood it earlier when he said: 
Corruption converts perfect competition to monopoly. 
 
Earlier in this paper we demonstrate that monopolist usually has a lower quality level 
than when competition is increased. Transparency is then important for competition, and 
thus for quality. The procurer may achieve transparency by making public all critical bid 
information and avoiding informational discrimination (have private contact with some 
bidders) and corruption. It may be advantageous to keep however some opacity. For 
example hidding bidders’ identity can help overcome tacit collusion. Industry members 
                                               
3
 Winner’s curse is when inexperience bidders bid aggressively at a price lower than real cost to win the 
contract. In turn the operator will lack financial resources and go bankrupt, so stop supplying. (see 
Amaral et al., 2008).  
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can use such information to punish treachery (competitor who break tacit agreements) 
(Amaral et al., 2008). Opacity must however be controlled so as to not ends up in 
corruption.  
 
The final action in this section to strengthen competition is dual sourcing (Laffont & 
Tirole, 1993). It consists to split the contract scope into several markets segments in 
order to preserve future competition by keeping many alternatives supply sources in 
activity. Clearly, instead of attributing a whole market to one supplier, authority can 
restructure the market into different packages and allocate those to different suppliers. 
Such techniques will enforce quality4 while preserving future competition by keeping 
many suppliers in business.  
Dual sourcing fits for experience good because it is more effective where asymmetric 
information is substantial (Laffont & Tirole, 1993). Through dual sourcing public 
authority can use his discretionary power to operate a public entity in some markets. 
That can help the public procurer to have an insight on operations, and thus be able to 
release critical information to bidders such as operation costs (Amaral et al., 2008).  
 
3.4.3 Contract price 
 
The price in supply contract can have a great influence on the quality. There is usually 
two types of prices that are discused in the incentive theory. Those are fixed price 
contract and cost plus contract. The first is considered to give high motivation to the 
supplier in order to increase his costs reduction effort, but at the expenses of quality 
(Bajari et al., 2001). In the opposite cost plus contract gives high quality incentives, 
however the supplier can overinvest in quality which would lead to cost inefficiency 
(Kinnumen, 2006). Bajari et al., (2001) have suggested that the optimal contract price 
which enriches quality at reasonable cost should be decided in connection with elements 
summarized in the matrix below: 
 
 
                                               
4
 It can extract private information (moral hazard and adverse selection) by involving a virtual 
competition (yardstick competition). 
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Table  2: Comparing FP with C+ contracts  
Source: Bajari et al., The Rand Journal of Economics, 2001; 32, 3.  
 
From the table  above, it appears that high powered quality incentive can be given to 
operator through cost reimbursement mechanisms. Such mechanisms consider 
flexibility by making possible quality adjustments. It is moreover a good device to align 
both the principal’s and the agent’s interests. In that sense (interest aligning), cost 
reimbursement device can mitigate the moral hazard issue described previously. 
However, cost plus contract puts all the risk on the principal. Consequently, the agent 
can be temptated to behave opportunistically by deterring quality (Douma &Schreuder, 
2002).  
                                                        Fixed Price                                     Cost Plus 
Risk allocation mainly 
on 
Contractor buyer 
Incentives for quality Less  More  
Buyer administration Less  More  
Good to minimize Costs  Schedule/delays 
Documentation efforts More Less  
Flexibility for change Less  More  
Adversarial 
relationship 
More  Less  
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Furthermore Bajari et al., (2001) suggested to consider complexity/uncertainty of 
quality (difficult to monitor) and its importance (relatively to budget or cost) if one 
wants to make the optimal choice.they defend that if quality is the main objective of the 
procurer, then a complex/uncertain project (with respect to quality) should be purchased 
through a cost plus contract in order to boost quality enrichment. However, as the risk of 
quality opportunism may remain (the agent bears no risk), the public procurer may 
design the contract so as to share in the risk with the agent. Such design can be achieved 
through partial cost reimbursement. That is to initiate the contract with a fixed price and 
thereafter include some cost reimbursement elements, especially if complexity is 
relatively modest. Such risk sharing mechanisms or partial cost reimbursement devices 
can be achieved through net contract or gross cost contracts in which a fixed price is 
first proposed, and then adjusted to major economic changes (indexation of consume 
price index, financing of additional transferable investments5) as time inconsistency 
shows its effect.  
3.4.4 Reputation and trust incentives 
 
In fact quality of experience goods requires in general necessary investments to be done 
either at the contract initiation stage, or during the contract. Some of these investments 
are usually not contractible, thus not verifiable by the principal (Laffont & Tirole, 1993) 
(p. 341). 
However such investments can be decisive for quality delivery (personal trening for 
better competence, R&D). For such quality aspect to be supplied, the supplier must have 
a reputation incentive (Laffont & Tirole, 1993) (p. 211). In other words, the supplier 
must be willing to signal to both competitors and potential customer that he is a quality 
supplier. Said explicitly, reputation incentive comes from the competition between 
suppliers to earn customers’ loyalty and secure future sales.  
 
Reputation incentive in competitive bidding can be designed through pre-qualification 
mechanism or selected-entry in tendering (only invited bidders compete). In such pre-
qualification, public autority usually based their choice on past performances, or 
                                               
5
 Transferable investments are infrastructure  investments  necessary for operation which are used by any 
supplier who win the contract  (Laffont &Tirole, 1993) 
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implicitly on good quality reputation. Therefore suppliers are more concerned about 
their quality reputation. Reputation can also be carried out through frequency of 
exchange. To say it differently, long term buying cooperation (frequent buying) with a 
contractor involves social exchanges (Heide, 1994; Buvik et Halskau, 2001). These 
social exchanges lead to an increase in the concern of reputation and trust from the 
contractor side who would be willing to secure future sales. The power of repuation as 
quality incentive is amplified if competition is aggressive because the contractor will 
then be willing to differentiate himself as high quality supplier. 
 
3.4.5 Contract duration as quality incentive 
 
Experience goods in most cases involve substantial investments which are necessary to 
establish supply capabilities or to maintain supply quality6. Part of such investments is 
not easily observed by the principal, thereby the potential of moral hazard is high if the 
contractor is not sure to recoup the capital cost during the contract period.  
 
It is usually believed that long contract duration is necessary for high investments 
buying situations. However, long term contrat does not oust the potential of moral 
hazard as the student syndrome can be a danger. The student syndrome is when the 
contractor believes that she has enough time and thus can delay (postpone) necessary 
quality investments (Parker et al., 2003). The delay of investment can deteriorate 
significantly the quality. Such quality opportunism embedded in long term contract may 
also be the consequence of the development of specific relation involved by long term 
contract. As it has been pointed out in the section 3.4.4, long historical cooperation 
(long term contract) may tied up public procurer in specific relationship with the 
contractor through socialization (social exchange).  
 
Another risk of long contract duration is that such contract can hinder competition for 
public contract concerning experience goods (De Silva et al., 2009). For those goods or 
services public authority is most often sole buyer. The suppliers who looses such 
contracts will be out of business for a long period, all of which can cause these suppliers 
                                               
6
 See Laffont & Tirole (1993, p. 341), or Kjerstad & Vagstad (2000) 
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to go into definitive bankrupcy (lack of financial resources to faces costs). In term, the 
lack of competition will amplify the moral hazard issue.  
Short duration contract can as for it discourages investments and leads to moral hazard 
since the supplier can fear the hold-up7 problem. In short contract duration, the 
contractor can avoid to take high capital cost investments if there is a risk on his 
contract or license-concession renewal. The reason is that the investments can be 
relation specific asset and therefore would be lost or sunk if the contract is not renewed.  
 
Effective contract duration incentive must then takes into account the level of 
investments to be involved. A contract duration relatively short coupled with an 
extension option binded by quality during the first contract leg can be optimal if quality 
is very important. The idea is to choose both contract duration and extension in a way 
that the total duration equals the real capital-recoup time of main investments. The short 
contract duration during the first leg of the contract can give a quality incentive to the 
contractor if high quality is the only condition of contract renewal (the extension 
option).   
3.4.6 Sub-contract coordination mechanisms  
 
Osmundsen et al., (2008) and Vickerman (2004) have analysed the conflict of interests 
between the public authority and the contractor further by extending the contract to sub-
contracting. Explicitly, the contractor in public project is usually engaged in sub-
contract agreements (sub-part procurements, maintenance of transport infrastructure) 
with a tier supplier or sub-contractor. In such case, it can appear as well a conflict of 
interest between the contractor (principal in sub-contract agreement) and the sub-
contractor (agent in sub-contract). However the sub-contractor can enjoy substantial 
bargaining power over the contractor which can weaken the power of the sub-contract 
incentives. The focal contractor can provide quality incentives to the tier supplier. But if 
the tier supplier has stronger bargaining power than him, those incentives may not reach 
the related quality expectations. However it can be that the sub-supply quality is critical 
for the focal contractor to deliver high quality to the public authority. In the practice, an 
                                               
7
 supplier fears that his investments can be exploited by competitor  in the case of non-renewal (kjerstad 
et al., 2000)  
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example is when the operator of highway exploitation sub-contracts the maintenance 
service to a tier supplier. If the quality of maintenance is poor, the quality delivered by 
the operator can be judged poor as well by the authority. It is then important for public 
buyer to consider the possibility of sub-contract when designing effective incentives to 
the operators.  
 
Vickerman (2004) explained that three incentive mechanisms can be used: full 
centralization (planned by authority), coordinated decentralization (authority is involved 
but don’t decide) and uncoordinated decentralization (authority has no insight on). He 
argues that coordinated decentralization mechanisms can achieve optimal quality 
enforcement. The mechanism consists to assist the contractor so as to increase his 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the sub-contractor. Consortium buying can be of help. It is a 
common buying system in which authority and contractor leverage their collective size 
(pool their purchase) and drive greater savings on the cost of purchased goods and 
services. Consortium buying can also help to negotiate better quality in sub-contracting 
since a high common purchased volume (of authority and operator) can be important 
enough (compare to the total sales of sub-supplier) to influence the sub-supplier’s 
decision, especially for routine service or products (Van Weel et Arjan, 2005). The 
following figure summarizes that section. 
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Fig. 1: sub-contracting coordination through the supply chain 
3.4.7 Sales incentives 
 
Sales incentives usually fit for search good (whose quality is known with accuracy 
before purchase). However, there is a typical sort of experience good for which sales 
incentives can be provided. As Laffont &Tirole (1993)(p.214) enlightened:  
 
We should comment on the possibility of having goods whose quality is observable by 
consumers but is not verifiable by regulator [public procurer]. We have in mind the 
case of television station or of a railroad, whose services are hard to measure 
objectively and yet are relatively well-perceived by the consumers.  
 
For such goods, if the demand is complementary to quality8 then incentives embedded 
in sales will be effective to reach the expected quality (Laffont & Tirole, 1993)(p.214). 
The idea is that users will not use the service if they observe poor quality in the 
                                               
8
 Complementary means that the more quality is good, the more users are satisfied and thus ask for more 
of that good or service. 
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delivery. And as long as supplier is remunerated through sales revenues, he will be 
given quality incentive if he can keep the additional sales revenues (generated by 
innovative quality) not described in the contract.   
 
Another power of sales as quality incentive is to be analysed in term of future sales. If 
poor quality leads to loose customer loyalty (complementary between demand and 
quality), then it is potential that the contract would not be renewed with a poor quality 
supplier in the future. However as demand is almost inelastic for public goods (in the 
sense that public procurer is sole or at least the main customer), existence can be 
jeopardized for that supplier (he/she may not have another market). The fear to come to 
that point (without market) is obviously sufficient to motivate the supplier to supply the 
expected quality in current contract.   
 
4. Empirical Evidence 
 
This section will first give a short presentation public procurement regulation in 
Norway. Thereafter follows the research methodology, and finally the empirical 
analysis will come.  
 
4.1 Public procurement in Norway 
 
Norway as member of the European Economic Community (EEC) is a part of the 
European Union (EU) internal market of goods, services, capital and persons. 
Subsequently the EU regulation of public procurement is in use in Norway (Fafo 
Østforum, 2006). This regulation carried out by the directive 2004/18/EC of the EU 
parliament is based on the idea of fair and transparent competition and non-
discrimination of nationality (one principle of the commission).  
More specifically, this regulation aims at ensuring that all interested economic operators  
bid for all public contracts and concessions within the EU on a fair and transparent 
basis. The interest of that regulation is to increase competition, and thereby enhance the 
quality of public projects at controllable costs (CEC, 2008). With the intention to ban 
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discrimination and corruption, the directive has introduced requirements about selection 
procedures, relevant exceptions and thresholds, participation terms, award criteria and 
enforcements. 
 
In Norway, the instruction 2006-04-07 nr 402 has given the standpoint of a new 
reglementation of public procurement in conformance with the EU directive. 
Competitive tendering mechanisms are compulsory to be used if public purchase values 
are at least equal to some defined thresholds. The following table presents the thresholds 
in use until the 29th of february 2008. 
Instructions for governmental procurement Threshold vales  
(exluded VAT) 
Central govermental dept. pdt and service purch. 
The regulation § 2 – 2 (2) 
1 050 000 
 
Other principal pdt and service purch., The regulations § 
2 – 2 (1) 
1 650 000 
Yearly instruct. Pronounc. Of planned pdt and serv. 
Purch., The regulation § 6 – 1 (1) 
6 000 000 
Part of task (serv.) that can except the EEA instuct. 
The regulation § 2 – 2 (3) 
600 000 
Every principal building projects,  The regulations § 2– 2 
(1) 
41 000 000 
Yearly instuct. Pronounc. For build. Projects 
The regulations § 6 – 1 (2) 
41 000 000 
Part of task (build. Proj.) excepted the EEA 
The regulations § 2 – 2 (3) 
8 000 000 
 
Table 3: Regulated threshold values for public procur. Applying to utilities sector 
valid 29 februar 2008.  
Source: www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fad/Tema/konkurransepolitikk 
 
And so, for all public acquisitions applying to the threshold values above, the following 
tendering procedures are to be used (§ 4 - 1): 
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 Open tender competition: All suppliers can participate in the competition, but it 
is not allowed to negotiate. 
 Restricted tender competition: only invited suppliers can participate in the 
competition. In some restricted cases (clearly limited cases), the procurer can engage 
competitive dialogue. 
 
In the case that the purchased value does not applied to any case above (purchased value 
under threshold), the procurer can go into direct negotiation. Though, the instruction 
asks the procurer to secure market competition in most cases possible. 
In addition to those threshold values, the main award criteria suggested by the 
instruction are mainly the lowest price (cost) or the economically most advantageous. In 
one case or another, there are four requirements to fullfil in order to secure fair 
competition (Sunde et al., 2008). Those are mainly: 
 
 The link of criteria to contract purpose and value:  The award should be linked 
to the need satisfied through the contract outcome. However procurer can require 
fullfilment of other elements which she believes can influence the contract outcome. 
Such elements can be financial viability, taxes attest, technical qualification proof, 
Health Security Environment (HSE) policy or employment policy.  
 
 Fairness of criteria: it means ensuring the principles of predictability (specify 
quality in details so every bidders can predict expectation in the same way), 
transparency (avoid informational discrimination) and accountability (possibility to 
verify how the evaluation or selection has been done).  
Predictability of award procedure seeks to ensure that all the bidders understand the 
quality specification clearly and in the same way. For that purpose, the public procurer 
is expected to described his quality expectation explicitly and to mention future possible 
modifications while precising the extent of such modifications (CEC, 2008; Trybus, 
2006). The latter (accountability) is a critical part of the procedure which needs to be 
clarified. In fact accountability forces the public authority to set up a clear evaluation 
mechanism to assess all the bids without favouritism. In practice, public procurer uses 
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to assess quality with a scale weighting every aspect of quality. The following table give 
a clear idea of such quality scaling.  
 
criteria Evaluation  
weight (%) 
Quality specifications 
Price 35 Yearly subsidy including partial cost 
reimbursement 
 
 
Age of ferry 
 
 
35 
 
Building year of main boat 
Age of reserve boat (less weighted) 
Delivery 
quality 
30 Preparedness for reserve boat 
Facility cleaning, maintenance  
 
Table 5: Example of quantitative evaluation of quality 
Source: Møre og Romsdal fylke (konkurransegrunnlag hurtigbåtruter) 
 
In this evaluation for example the quality aspect denominated as age of ferry is 
weighted by 30% in the overall weight of the bid. And every bid proposition is 
evaluated on a scale varying from 1 to 5 where 5 is the best suggestion and 1 the 
poorest.  
 
  Unambiguity or clearness of award: it is the responsibility of procurer to 
specify the bid in a way that all bidders understand clearly the specification, and in the 
same way. 
 
 Publication or notification:  public procurer should notify any market in the EU 
TED-database (european public market database) and on DOFFIN (the country public 
market webside). 
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4.2 Methodology of the research 
 
The research method used in this paper is the Multi-Cases study. Generally the Cases 
study method emphasizes on either quantitative assessment of the problem, or a 
qualitative one. We have adopted the qualitative method to carry out this analysis.   
Dealing with quality specification in public buying of experience goods and service as 
the unit of analysis, this exploratory paper emphasizes on the implementation of 
effective quality incentives suggested in the literature for experience good or service 
purchasing.  
 
4.2.1 Description of qualitative analysis 
 
The qualitative method is an analysis technique to conduct an in-depth study of one or a 
small number of Cases to explore a problem.  
As Bagchi and Larsen (2002) write, a qualitative study in a case study is desirable when 
a ‘’what’’, ‘’how’’ or ‘’why’’ questions are being posed about a current set of events or 
problems, over which the investigator has little or no control. Similarly we want to 
explore what quality incentives exist in the literature of IT and how these incentives are 
implemented in day-to-day public procurement practice in Norway.  
The issue with the qualitative analysis in a Case study is the problem of 
reliability/validity and the generalization of the result derived. The small number of 
observations (few Cases) in such analysis may influence negatively the significance of 
the results, thus their generalization. In fact those few Cases may be affected by some 
endogenous   or periodic variables which can make it tricky to generalize the results to 
other Cases. It is therefore recommended to carry out some validity and reliability tests 
in Case study in general, and more specifically in qualitative analysis (Ellram, 1996).  
There are different forms of reliability. Among those is equivalent reliability. It is the 
extent to which different items measure an identical concept at an identical level of 
difficulty. Interrater reliability refers to the fact that different individuals come to an 
agreement after assessing the consistency of the implementation. 
Validity as for it is fostered when one can reach an agreement between theory and a 
specific measurement device or procedure.   
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In connection to the problem described in section 1.2 we have selected three Cases to 
carry out the empirical analysis. The choice of these Cases is explained by the fact that 
they are related to the transportation and the health sectors which have been described 
as sector with high quality measurement problem. As predict by the literature, we 
expect high potential of moral hazard and adverse selection in these Cases. So we would 
anticipate finding prominent examples of extensive use of the quality incentives 
suggested in the literature.  
With reference to reliability, the selected Cases through which the problem will be 
investigated are different in term of authority buyer, award process, risk level of moral 
hazard and adverse selection, quality importance and their related incentives used.   
The selected cases can be presented as follow: 
 
 The tendering of the regional ferry route 32 in Møre og Romsdal County 
initiated by public authority which was represented by the County administration. The 
Transport Department (TD) of the administration has been delegated power to carry a 
competitive tendering process (as estimated budget above the threshold define for 
utilities - transport service-) on behalf of the authority, thus constituting the 
procurement function. An open tendering was adopted with the lowest cost as award 
criterion.  
In this tendering, the incumbent has been the sole bidder at the end of the process. 
However, the tendering has been cancelled because the TD was not satisfied about 
bidder’s price (NOK 20 millions more than previous yearly price). It is important to 
signal that the tendering took place in high economic conjuncture (finance crisis). The 
TD considered that the subsequent high capital cost explained the weak competition (the 
financial risk was high so the bid was not attractive enough for bidders). As well it 
should be mentioned that quality has been given a very high importance in this bid since 
a new brand ferry was specified, all of which resulted in high bid price. The TD is now 
running a negotiated short term contract with the sole bidder (incumbent as well); the 
TD expects to re-organized a new tender latter and is envisaging to tender a package of 
ferry routes (increase the scope of the contract) so as to make the bid more attractive to 
increase competition. 
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 The franchise contract concerning the ‘’hurtigbåtruter’’ or fast boat route in 
Møre og Romsdal County. The authority remains the same as in the previous case and 
the TD was the same buyer. A tendering process has also been used in this case. The 
contract has been awarded to the company TIDE CRUISE which is operating now. 
TIDE CRUISE was a new comer in this bid but existed already in the industry. The 
award criterion was the most economically advantageous which was interpreted as 
reasonable costs and good quality (age of boat and delivery quality). 
 
 The procurement of ambulance service in the health region called MIDT-
NORGE RHF. In this procurement situation the administration of this health region was 
the public buyer. With the intention to restructure the ambulance services (one of its 
responsabilities) in the districts of Sør-Trondelag, Nord-Trøndelag and Møre og 
Romsdal, the HMN decided to contract out such service to private suppliers so as to 
obtain better value for money from existing budget and improved quality.  
Knowing the benefits from increased competition on the expected supply quality, and 
especially due to legal constraints the HMN adopted competitive tendering with 
negotiation to govern the contract. The award criterion was the most economically 
advantageous expressed through costs and pertinence of solutions suggestion with 
respect to quality specification. Few bidders have been awarded contracts at the end of 
the process. Among these winners were new entrants in the market with relatively large 
size and well structured or organized. These big sized new comers went into a lease deal 
with the small incumbents who have lost to hire their existing competences. However 
the small operators succeeded to negotiate profitable compensation (salaries) for them. 
The big sized winners end up a consequence on real operation costs higher than the 
contracted subsidy level. Many contracts are now retendered again. 
 
As the cases have been briefly presented, we have identified three variables which will 
guide this study.  
 
 
 
 34 
4.2.2 Variables in the analysis 
 
Three variables have been chosen to guide the analysis in this study. Those are the 
quality background, the potential of moral hazard and adverse selection, and the 
incentives implemented. We may have added more variable in our study to make our 
result more reliable. However for simplicity reason, we decide to go with these 
variables to explore the problem defined in section 1.2.  
The variables can be presented as follow. 
 
4.2.2.1 Quality background 
 
The quality background refers to the quality specified in the bid as it is understood by 
the public procurer. The data concerning that variable are collected from the 
procurement function which carried the tendering (interviews) and through tendering 
documentations. In addition we have reformulated that specified quality in academic 
terminology based on relevant literature. 
 
4.2.2.2 Potential of quality opportunism 
This variable is designated to explore the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection on 
the quality as specified in the bid. In other words this variable will help identifying how 
the contractor can be tempted to take discretionary actions or to hide his exclusive 
information in order to deter the expected quality ex-post contract. Every aspect of the 
specified quality in the bid documentation will be analysed according to that variable 
variable. 
 
4.2.2.3 Implementation of quality incentives 
Here we will explore how the quality mechanisms suggested by theory pioneers in the 
relevant literature are applied in day-to-day practice. We expect to go through how the 
contract is written to identify which contract aspect can commit the contractor or 
operator to his/her quality obligation. Thereafter such practical quality commitment will 
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be linked to one or some of the theoretical incentive devices underlined so far in this 
paper.  
 
4.2.3 Data set  
 
The procurement function in public administration is usually the major actor in public 
buying therefore we targeted this function for the purpose of our study. As well, 
questionnaires have been elaborated based on theoretical and conceptual considerations. 
It is important to enlighten that our study is of qualitative type. And so, beside the data 
collected through interviews, we have scrutinized primary and secondary sources of 
information to provide the additional information needed. Such sources were text books, 
journals, articles, reports, notification of tendering, and electronic search engines such 
as DOFFIN (website of Norwegian public markets).  
 
4.3 Empirical analysis  
 
4.3.1 Case 1: The regional ferry route 32 in Møre-og-Romsdal County 
 
Quality backround 
This Case concerns an experience service as the supply of the service purchased took 
place after the contract signature. According to the specification, the quality aspects 
were mainly safety, ponctuality/frequency, reliability, responsiveness, timeliness, 
appearance of personal and their competence, information communication, and access 
and ease of use.  
 
In fact it was specified a new-brand ferry to comply to new regulation for better safety 
and security on all norwegian ships. Given the cost of new brand ferry, it can be 
identified that quality was very important in this bid. Beside safety, reliability of supply 
was an interest in the contract. Reliability was expressed through a guarantee payment 
(25% of the yearly contract price) which was asked to bidders. By that guarantee 
payment an insurrance was given to authority ensuring that operator was viable 
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financially to secure future supply. As well, a detailed schedule has been provided by 
the authority as a part of the contract specification so as to signal ponctuality/frequency 
to future operator (departures and arivals were known ex-ante contract).  
 
A reserve ferry (second ferry) was also required to respond to potential schedule 
disturbance which could be created by an unexpected event (ferry breakdown, 
unexpected demand surplus). The authority judged necessary to define in the 
specifications an intervention time window of the reserve ferry (lead time to respond). 
The definition of such time window was meant to avoid long response lead time, in 
other words to foster timeliness aspect of quality concerning the reserve ferry.  
 
The authority precised that the crew and other on-board personal should be 
distinguishable through their uniforms (local law on crew appearence). Ease of 
access/use was not ignored in the bid as the operator was expected to accommodate 
ferry access and use for persons with reduced capacities (handicaps).  
 
Finally it was the responsibility of the operator to communicate necessary information 
about his/her operations (schedules, delays, other relevant informantion) through 
brochures, media and display screens recommanded inside the ferry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Summary of quality in the tendering of ferry service in Møre og Romsdal 
Fylket 
 
 
 
 
-  Safety  
-  Responsiveness and timeliness 
-  Ponctuality & frequency 
-  Personal appearance & certification 
-  Communication (marketing) 
-  Ease of use & access 
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Potential for quality opportunism   
The TD who was the procurer in this Case and who was in charge to follow the 
execution of the contract was not supposed to be represented at the operator site for the 
purpose of quality monitoring.  
 
In general, the users or passengers of transport service observe the supply quality as 
they experience it daily. That was something the TD could not easily do, especially 
when they (TD members) are not present on the site permanently. In such case, the 
operator could cancel some scheduled travels or delay them to deter the 
punctuality/frequency aspect in order to save some operations costs. He could for 
example save wage costs since delays or cancellation reduce working time, thus salary 
of personal.  
 
The potential of moral hazard was high with respect to responsiveness and timeliness. In 
fact the reserve ferry was supposed to be kept for eventual use. That means the operator 
was asked to acquire an asset which was not used for production or as it should be, to 
say it differently.  
However as a profit seeker, the firm could be temptated to redirect that asset (reserve 
ferry) to alternative uses which could generate additional rents or profits for her since 
the probability of unexpected events appearance (events which should lead to the use of 
reserve ferry in the focal  contract) was a random. In the case that the asset was 
effectively reallocated, both responsiveness and timeliness would be endangered.  
 
Moral hazard was not the only informational risk, adverse selection was also present. A 
hit-and-run9 company could have been selected to run the contract (as the bidding was 
open), all of which would end up in poor quality or supply suspension (as that hit-and-
run operator could lack required competence and qualification to supply effective 
quality).  
 
 
 
                                               
9
 A hit-and-run company refers to firm which does not meet the requirement but can submit a predatory 
bid to win and deteriorate later the quality (alexandersson et al., 2006).  
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Implementation of quality incentive 
Various incentives devices have been used in this case to face the potentiality of 
informational rents and its negative effect on quality.  
 
The TD aware of such risks has first used a screening mechanism to extract information 
about bidders’ financial viability. The payment of a guarantee which was worth 25% of 
the annual bid price was expected to provide such information. According to the TD, 
that decision was meant to discourage unserious bidders because the amount was 
relatively high and it was sunk in the case of quality deterioration.  
Another screening device was the requirement to provide a taxes attest. The taxe attest 
recounts bidder’s activity (indirectly via taxes payment, the procurer had information 
about past activity, legal existence, …). Finally the bidders were supposed to explain 
their HSE policy and strategies to fullfil specified operations. That gave the TD an 
insight on bidders’ experience and competences.  
The TD specified also the use of real-time data system by operator to record ferry 
movements. These technical tools were according to the TD believed to provide quality 
monitoring devices. In fact from the data recorded the authority could track how 
ponctual/frequent the operator was. And because a sanction scheme specifying penalty 
payments for poor quality (such as delay) was specified in the bid, the TD believed that 
the operator would respect his quality obligation with all those effective monitoring 
tools. As such tools can involve some opportunity cost (for analysis of the data-time), 
the TD required in the bid that future operator submits a self report on all contracted 
quality breaking. To foster the reliabilty of such self report, penalty payments were 
provided to punish false report as well. A very poor quality was automatically expected 
to lead to contract cancellation. In total, the technological devices coupled with the self 
monitoring mechanisms and the coercive incentives (sanctions) were believed to boost 
quality effectiveness.  
Another monitoring device expected to strenghten the previous enforcement 
mechanisms was a monitoring system from users named as decibel system by the TD. It 
consists in the ability of users to denounce poor quality in local media (as users observe 
poor quality by using the service, they will tend to express their unhappyness to make 
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political pressures).The TD relied then on users to reveal a fail in his own monitoring 
mechanism. 
 
The TD believed in the benefits of aggressive competition on both quality and costs. 
Therefore, they released some information they considered as critical for bidders to bid 
aggressively. The information encompassed statistics on traffic (and revenues as the 
same time) and local population growth, as well as geography, existing infrastructure 
(quai). 
Such information was meant to reduce or eliminate the information advantage of the 
incumbent while helping bidders to assess wisely their optimism (accurate estimation of 
contract costs). It has been shown how unexperienced bidders can submit a overoptimist 
bid to win and deter quality later (winner’s curse). Also there is no doubt that critical 
information possessed only by incumbent can deter entry (constitutes a barrier for 
entrant to access a market) thus limiting competition. 
Competition was also fostered through transparency in the award process. No private 
communication between the TD and a single bidder was allowed, all information was 
made public to all of the bidders in order to avoid corruption. For the purpose of 
corruption, the TD adopted a quantitative scheme to assess both quality and price so as 
to provide accountability of the evaluation process which was moreover public. 
 
The TD offered a net contract, which basically means that a subsidy was paid to cover 
the difference between operation costs and the revenues from ticket sales. The subsidy 
was fixed in principle, but the inflation level was indexed to it in order to reflects a part 
of economic changes.  
By offering the net contract adjusted to inflation, the TD expected to provide an 
effective quality incentive. It is clear that the fixed subsidy included in the net contract 
put a very high financial risk on the contractor. Therefore the TD wanted to share in 
such risk by covering the additional costs incurred by inflation (general price increase) 
over the contract duration. Energy price or salaries may increase more than the local 
Consume Price Index (CPI or the inflation index). The difference (when wage increases 
more than inflation) is then the contractor’s part of risk. 
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Another financial risk sharing was the fact that the authority took the responsibility to 
pay for the cost of infrastructure investments (quai). By bearing the cost of such 
transferable investments the TD removed the fear of hold-up (supplier fear to invest in 
asset which could be used by competitor if his license is not renewed) which could deter 
quality.   
 
Continuing with investments, the TD understood how important it was for bidders to 
extend investment cost over a long period for the capital recoup. If the contract duration 
is long, the annuity to recoup the capital every year will not be high; and then bidders 
can submit a low bid-price to win the price competition. However if they face a short 
duration to recoup the capital, the annuity will be high, thus the price. The TD 
understood that bidders may submit a low bid to win the contract and behave 
opportunistically even if the contract duration is shorter. As well if the contract is long 
they can also behave opportunistically as the TD will be tied in a specific relationship. 
And so if they offer a short term contract with an extension option, bidders will be 
willing to submit a relatively low bid price because they will have the second contract 
leg to complete the recoup. The quality incentive is given by linking the renewal option 
(extention) to the supply of high quality during the first contract leg. Therefore the TD 
awarded the contract for 8 years time span with a 2 years extension option. In total the 
contractor would have 10 years (duration + extension) to recoup the capital cost of his 
investments if he/she fulfills his quality obligation (satisfactory quality).  
 
The final incentive in this case to be analysed is sales incentives. A quality incentive 
was given to the operator by allowing him to keep revenues from ticket sales. The 
reason is that the operator could innovate for better quality or services to create new 
demand generated10 and earn additional revenues. For example during the sommer 
season, innovative services can attract tourists and create additional revenue.  
Also, it was specified in the contract that a significant increase in the traffic volume 
more than the one forecasted by the TD (statistics on traffic growth) will lead to 
                                               
10
 It should not be ignored that the TD has provided traffic forecast which has been used by bidders to 
estimate operation costs. So the bid price was based on such forecast. In the case of a new demand (which 
can be generated by very good quality or innovative services), the revenue derived from that new demand 
is kept by contractor in addition to the fixed subsidy.  
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renegotiation. According to the theory, renogotiation can generate rents for operator  
through bargaining power. That is the contractor can negotiate some compensation he 
could not do at the selection because of competition and regulation. 
By increasing its demand more than the forecasted traffic volume (forecasted by the TD 
self) through better quality, the contractor would force the TD into renogotiation where 
he could derive.  
 
 
4.2.2 Caes 2: The ‘’Hurtigbåtsanbud’’ or the regional speed boat contract   
 
This procurement situation is closer to the previous one studied as the authority remains 
the same and the services purchased are approximatively of same type: The fast boat 
carries only passengers while the ferry is used to transport both passengers and vehicles. 
Because of that similarity, we judge unnecessary to repeat the analysis where there is no 
significant difference with the previous case. 
 
Quality background 
Quality in this Case is basically the same as described in the previous case. The only 
difference which deserves to be pointed out is that a new brand boat has not been 
required here. However, it does not mean that the TD did not expect safety to be an 
significant aspect of quality.  
According to the TD, the geography in this Case did not impose particular safety 
requirements asking for new boat. They (The TD) considered that a well maintained 
boat could provide proper safety for users. Therefore they specified safety through the 
age of boat. The TD considered that an old boat could be dangerous.  
 
Beside safety, the TD defined the capacity that the boat should have. The reason for that 
capacity definition was to ensure sufficient availability on the boat in order to satisfy 
travelling demand.  
The last quality aspect not specified in the previous Case is tidiness. It was explicitly 
pointed out in the specification that passengers’ facilities should be appropriately 
maintained and cleaned.   
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Exepted the aspects of quality described in this section, all the other aspects enlightened 
in Case 1 were also actual in the current Case.  
 
 
Potential of moral hazard and adverse selection    
As the service purchased here was of same type as Case 1, the potential of moral hazard 
remains in this Case as well. We have shown in Case 1 that contractor may behave 
opportunistically with respect to ponctuality (regularity and frequency), responsiveness, 
safety, reliability, timeliness, appearance of personal and their competence, information 
communication, and access/ease of use.  
 
The new quality aspects introduiced in this Case by the TD did not escape from moral 
hazard. In fact, tidiness is in general difficult to verify because the contractor mays 
accuse users to make the facility dirty every time he (contractor) cleans it. To say it 
differently, facilities get dirty with extensive use. Aware of that, contractor may avoid 
cleaning activity (or reduce its frequency) in order to save costs.  
As well, extensive use of new boat may make it weaker with referrence to safety as 
compared to an old boat not often used. Also we can interpret the specification of 
different capacities for reserve-boats as a requirement to keep many boats (one for each 
capacity specified). In that case, the contractor will bear huge opportunity costs (he 
looses money by not using the asset regularly), all of which will motivate him to behave 
opportunistically.   
 
There is great risk of adverse selection on the safety aspect expressed through age of 
boat. A old boat but well maintained can insure better safety than a relatively new boat 
but non maintained. 
 
 
Quality incentives implementation 
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All the incentives described in Case 1 have exactly been used in the same way. We 
judge therefore unncessary to come back to them. However, there are elements we 
would like to underlign here. 
 
The TD allowed the contractor to charge some of the operation costs on passengers. It 
was specified that the contractor could increase fares until 4% more than the increase in 
CPI11. Such direct charge was considered as quality incentive because it reduces the 
high financial risk bore by the contractor when energy price or wages increase more 
than the CPI. And so the contractor could use such possibility (fare increase) to charge 
such additional quality costs. This can mitigate in term the quality opportunism.  
As well, the contractor had the possibility to restructure the boat allocation (schedule 
and frequency) as described in the bid. In fact, it could happen that the contractor faces 
no demand for certain schedule at certain point of time. However, as the contractor was 
forced to respect the schedule, he would have operated inefficiently (the ferry travel 
without demand). Therefore the TD allowed him to reduce the travel frequency where 
the demand was low and reallocate the boat to increase the travel frequency in other 
places where the demand was high. Such flexibility in boat allocation can help the 
contractor providing better quality (satisfy demand increase) and generate appropriate 
revenues. It can also lead to cost savings in operation costs. Flexibility in boat allocation 
can thus motivate the contractor to redirect those savings to quality investments. As 
such flexibility can also lead to moral hazard, the TD specified that the totall route 
production (in kilometers) should remain the same. Explicitly, the contractor should 
supply exactly the expected quality and not use the flexibility to deter quality.  
 
4.2.3 Case 3: The procurement of ambulance services by Helse Midt-
Norge     
 
Quality background 
Quality in ambulance services is usually complex to define. Generally quality includes  
maintenance of equipments and facility, efficient communication center (call taking, 
resources deployment), operation responsiveness and timeliness, safety and risk 
                                               
11
 The TD allowed the contractor to increase fare up to 4% in addition to the indexation of the CPI. 
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management (vehicles, employees, patients), organization management (public relation, 
human resources, insurrance, response plan), and integration of ambulance firm to 
hospital and other emergency agencies. Those elements have been taken into account in 
the specification of the bid as follow: 
 Facilities and equipments maintenance: it should be included in the bid 
explanation about parking and car cleaning policy, offices and room availability for 
training or teaching, garderobe and sleeping rooms.  
 Responsiveness and timeliness: the bidders were required to explain their 
response plan. Also a time window for intervention was speficified. Finally a 
requirement was made about the availability of intervention  personal (operational 
human resources) to foster responsiveness and timeliness. 
 Organization management: the bid has specified how public relation 
management will be carried, certification and knowledges updating of personal to 
master clinical standards.   
 Integration of ambulance firm to hospital and other safety agencies: it has been 
described how information should be coordinated between the operator and the buyer 
representations (through e-mail, telefaks,…), as well as the imposition of a standard  
format for incident reports (Ulstein,ambulance journal,…) and uniforms wearing.  
 Safety and risk management: It is related to the specification about patient and 
personal property, the type of vehicles, incident reporting and appropriate instruments to 
be used on-board.    
 Efficient communication system: that has been expressed through the 
specification of technological communication tools to be used by the operator in each 
ambulance. 
The following figure summarizes the quality aspects in this procurement: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quality of 
ambulance 
service 
 
-  Facilities an equipment maintenance 
-  Responsiveness and timeliness 
-  Organization management 
-  Integration of ambulance firm to 
hospital and other safety agencies 
-  Safety and risk management 
-  Efficient communication system 
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Fig 3: Quality aspects of the ambulance services   
Sources: The American Commission on Accreditation of Ambulance Service (CAAS), 
(www. Caas.org, 09.05.2009 
 
Potential for quality opportunism (moral hazard and adverse selection)  
Ambulance services in principle are out-of-hospital care services. It is then in principle 
difficult for the procurer to measure quality performance because only the patient can 
observe it. In such case, the potential of moral hazard in general is high for those 
services. For example, it is difficult for HMN (the buyer) to verify how long time 
(responsiveness) the contractor takes to perform an emergency operation when he 
receives a call.  
As well, on-board personal should in principle give the first treatment to the patient 
during the evacuation (intensive cares in case of heart attack for example). In the case 
that the patient passed away during the evacuation, it would be difficult to verify if on-
board personal (nurses) have done their job properly.  
 
Another moral hazard potentiality is the fact that the contractor was required to hold 
some training programms so as to update personal knowledges and competences (how 
to handle patient with new deseases such as the FLU). However as such programms 
incurrs costs for the contractor, he can be temptated to avoid them even though those 
programms will boost personal effectiveness (better quality). The same issue appears as 
the operator was required to integrate his organization to hospitals and other emergency 
agencies. Such integration can create importants investments (EDI, real-time data 
system) and generate related transaction costs (hold up), all of wich can discourage 
contractor to engage such investments necessary for quality.  
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For all these potentialities of information risks, the need to design quality incentives can 
be helpful to provide quality commitment. 
 
 
Quality incentives implementation 
Competitive tendering with negotiation is basically both an effective screening and a 
reputation incentives. In fact, the HMN has carried a prequalification process which 
helps to reject unexperienced and unserious suppliers. The prequalification has been 
followed by a dialogue or negotiation to make necessary adaptations. The negotiation 
process in general allows the procurer to get closer to each bidder.  
And through such proximity the procurer can learn closely about bidders competences, 
qualification and reliability. The two devices are enough to discourage unserious bidders 
and keep them from entry. In other words, competitive dialogue can be an appropriate 
answer to adverse selection.  
Coercive quality incentives were other screening incentives provided to contractor. The 
contract specified that the contractor would pay damage compensations to the 
Norwegian Patient Compensation (NPE) in the case that patients undergo damages 
during evacuation operations. Such insurance mechanism can force the contractor to 
train his employees properly or to foster the safety aspect of quality in this case.  
Beside such indirect sanction, the contractor was informed in the bid about the 
deduction of 0,1% in the contract price if poor quality was remarked. To reveal such 
poor quality, the HMN specified that internal audits will possibly be carried if the case 
(poor quality) was suspected. 
 
In the specification, the HMN showed his willingness to apply transparency and non-
discrimination principles. Elements prooving those are the adoption of sealed bids, 
restriction on private contacts between procurer and bidders. By doing so, the HMN 
expected to create conditions of fair competition as the benefits of the latter 
(competition) on quality could be significant.  
It is moreover for the purpose of fair competition that the HMN held bidders’ identity 
confidencial. As claimed in the litterature, opacity on bidders’ identity can eliminate 
vague desires of tacit collusion (Amaral et al., 2008). Beside the previous elements to 
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promote competition, the HMN also fostered dual sourcing to maintain future 
competition. in fact the health region was divided into several areas and each of those 
areas was tendered separetely instead of offerring a single package. It was expected that 
many bidders would be interested so as to increase competition. 
 
As it has been stated above, ambulanse services are generally complex services. They 
necessitate important investments to be done. These investments can be observable 
(equipment), non verifiable (trainings), or even non transferable (competences, learning 
by doing). As predicted by the theory, partial costs reimbursement incentives (fixed 
price with inflation indexation) can motivate contractor to carry such investments. The 
price form used in this Case was gross costs12 contract. The gross costs contract  as 
opposed to net contract consists to pay a whole fixed  subsidy every year which are 
supposed to cover all the operation costs of operator. That is the contractor would not 
keep any sales revenues but can perform sales activity for the principal. As health care is 
free in Norway, there was no sales revenue in this Case. Such fixed price mechanism  
was then expected to be adjusted in order to take into account exogenous changes such 
as wages and CPI. The following mechanism was adopted for adjustments: 
 
Adjusted price = 70% * changes in private nurses’ salary (statistic provide by the 
Statistic Office) + 30%* changes in CPI (CPI1998= 100) 
The above formula for the price adjustment can be interpreted as 70% of wages increase 
would be indexed to the fixed price every year. It is just 30% of the inflation which was 
indexed to the price. The reason for that is to reduce the high financial risk bore by the 
contractor when wages increase more than the general inflation (interpreted as CPI).   
Beside the above price modification from the second year, the HMN decided to cover 
ferry costs (when evacuating patients from ilelands),  and to pay compensation to 
contractor for eventual introduction of value added taxes (VAT).  
 
With respect to reputation as incentive, the HMN adopted competitive dialogue as 
governance structure. In general competitive dialogue is engaged with well known 
                                               
12
 Gross costs contract pays the operator a global sum to provide a specified service for a specified period. 
All revenue collected is generally for the authority, but in this case there is no revenue because health care 
services are free in Norway. 
 48 
suppliers in the market (experienced suppliers known for their quality). In other words, 
the HMN selected the potential suppliers for negotiation according to their good quality 
reputation. The HMN believed that suppliers would be more concerned about their 
reputation as good quality suppliers for future sales since it was obvious that a 
contractor who will behave opportunistically will not be contacted for dailogue in the 
future.  
 
Sub-contracting is generally a practice relevant for ambulance firm. The sub-contract 
concerns most often a critical part of the contract (communication center for example). 
To say it differently, the quality supplied by contractor can significantly be influenced 
by the quality of sub-supplier or tier 1 suppliers. It has been pointed out in the literature  
that a firm can influence the quality decisions of its suppliers if the purchasing volume 
of the first (firm) is relatively important compared to the aggregated sales volume of 
that supliers (Van Weele & Arjan, 2005). The reason is that high purchasing volume will 
give to the firm an importance vis-à-vis the supplier. And from that importance the firm 
can derive a bargaining power to negotiate a better quality or a lower unit cost.  
The HMN aware that the sub-contractor may have stronger bargaining power than the 
contractor to influence the contract quality, proposed a common buying mechanism with 
the contractor. It must be understood here that such common buying or consortium 
buying may increase contractor’s bargaining power (common with the authority) vis-à-
vis the tier supplier.  For example, the HMN took the responsibility to sub-contract 
directly with ferry firms as the first has more bargaining than the contractor vis-à-vis the 
ferry company. As well, the HMN proposed another consortium buying for certain 
standardized or routine products. Those are generally products which are bought in 
small quantity from many suppliers. Because the HMN is responsible for many 
hospitals, it had already a pooling mechanism (centralized buying for many hospitals) 
which gave it a bargaining power. And by buying for the contractor, the HMN increases 
even its own bargaining power (additional purchasing volume of the contracted), and 
hence can influence sub-supplier’s decision for improved quality and costs saving 
(ordering & units costs).  
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Contract duration mechanism was also used to create quality commitment. In fact, it 
was specified a contract duration of 5 years. And in the case that bidders acquired new 
brand equipment (vehicles), 5 years may not be enough to recoup the capital costs. 
Therefore the HMN offered a 3 years extension option which was conditioned by a 
good quality delivery during the first 5 years. Contractor was then expected to be 
motivated to supply the expected quality through such extension option in order to have 
8 years for recoup.  
 
5. Critics and suggestions  
 
Table 5 provides a summary of quality incentives implemented in the three cases we 
have studied so far.  
 
The message from what we witnessed in this study is clear: There is a high risk on 
quality expectations in public experience goods contracts, especially when these goods 
are acquired through competitive tendering. While the sources of the quality risks are 
well known (moral hazard and adverse selection) the formulation of appropriate 
answers to mitigate them can be challenging in the implementation.  
 
Screening incentives for example at the award stage are believed to boost future quality 
by eliminating adverse selection. Different devices have been used in this study to 
extract the hidden information (see Table 5). In Case 1 the most potential hidden 
information which can damage future quality is contractor’s qualification and 
competence since a new brand ferry is easy to recognize. The devices used seem to be 
adequate to extract such information. As Kjerstad et al. (2000) have shown, guarantee 
payment involves self selection which can discourage bidders who don’t meet the basics 
requirement of qualification (unserious bidders), and therefore mitigate the risk of 
asymmetry information.  
However there is a doubt on the effectiveness of guarantee device in Case 2 with respect 
to safety. In fact, the potentiality of hidden information may be higher on the safety 
aspect in Case 2. The reason is that safety was translated into age of boat in the Case. 
We have already shown that age itself was an inefficient measurement of safety because 
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other elements such as poor maintenance and extensive use can make a young boat 
unsafe. Neither guarantee nor taxes attest and HSE declaration seem suitable to reveal 
how bidders maintained or used their boat in previous contracts in order to fill the gap. 
One can think that the procurer may extract such information by having closer contact 
with bidders. For example the use of competitive dialogue as in Case 3 may have more 
effective in that sense.   
 
For the use of competition as quality incentive, it was smart that the buyer in all the 3 
Cases studied so far, understood the importance to remove the informational entry 
barriers. The release of statistical information on traffic, population and geography in 
Cases 1 and 2 was helpful as it may reduce the winner’s curse. Indeed, the effect on 
winner’s curse may have been successful if bidders were oriented on engineering costs 
and weather condition in the Case 1. According to the specification, the new brand ferry 
required in the bid was explained by the particularity of the weather conditions present 
in the areas, which necessitate an increase in the safety aspect of boat. Such 
environmental uncertainty added to the financial uncertainty (high economic 
conjuncture) increased significantly the risk bore by the contractor. That may explained 
the weak competition noticed in the bid (only the incumbent was the sole bidder). An 
explanation can be found in the high potential of moral hazard as possible alternative for 
the operator to survive (as competition will drive price down). So the firms concerned 
about their reputation may avoid entry in order to not behave opportunistically ex-post 
to survive.  
Also it may be that the concentration of the industry in Norway (only few operators are 
present) aggravated the effect of high uncertainty on competition in Case 1 since the 
incumbent had an information advantage on weather conditions than them. Explicitly 
the few operators may have avoided competing because the incumbent had more 
strategic information than them; and as it were other ferry areas in the country they 
expected no competition as well in the market where they will have information 
advantages. 
The public procurer may have increased competition in this Case by releasing 
information on weather conditions so as to reduce the uncertainty. There are in general 
many strategies to do so. 
 51 
As Amaral et al. (2008) advised, the procurer can for example with his discretionary 
power hold a public entity and competes the same service delivery with privates firms in 
another area with similar environmental uncertainties. By doing so, public authority 
could have had an insight on engineering costs, weather, and thus quality standards for 
benchmarking. Such benchmarking known as Yardstick competition is a part of dual 
sourcing. The procurer in Case 3 has used such mechanism. He has segmented his 
health region in many sub-areas or market segments and held public ambulance 
operators in some of these areas. The fact to carry out competition for the access of 
areas non- operated by public entity can be beneficial for quality expectation as well.  
However the effectiveness of such incentive depends on the size of the segment and the 
market structure. Solvoll & Mathisen (2008) has shown how market concentration 
(oligopoly) in the buss industry in Norway involved by aggressive competition 
(predatory pricing and cross subsidization) favours tacit collusion. Competitors avoid 
real competition and instead of, share the market segments among them.  Amaral et al. 
(2008) came to the same observation in the buss industry in England. It is therefore 
important for the procurer to not offer too many small segments for bidding if the entry 
barriers are generally high in the industry (high investments) and especially when the 
market is concentrated such as the ferry sector in Norway. Those few actors may avoid 
aggressive competition especially when the number of segments is more than the 
number of bidders. The procurer can instead of, organize them in packages to make 
them more attractive for increased competition13. 
To minimize the impact of tacit collusion on dual sourcing mechanism, opacity on 
bidders’ identity can be appropriate, especially if the difference of costs in the industry 
is significant. In fact the other competitors may punish the firm who break tacit 
agreement if his identity is discovered.14 
 
 
                                               
13
 As the size of market is relatively important (relatively few markets) tacit collusion will be difficult to 
maintain in an oligopoly since it will not be enough to be shared for all. 
14
 If costs are significantly different in the industry, the effective competitors can punish treachery 
through predatory pricing (Alexandersson, 2008)  
Table 5: Summary of Incentives implemented in the three Cases
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
 
 
Screening  
 
- Guarantee  
- Taxes attest 
-HSE policy declaration   
- Real time data record 
- Self report 
-User monitorin/decibel 
 -Monetary sanction 
/compens. 
- Guarantee  
- Taxes attest 
- HSE policy declaration    
- Real time data record 
- Self report 
- User monitoring/decibel 
 -Monetary sanction /compens. 
- Prequalification 
- Dialogue/ negotiation 
- Audit 
- Patient damage compensation 
- Monetary sanction payments  
Competition  - Info Release 
- Transparency 
-Quantitative Evaluation 
of quality 
- Info Release 
- Transparency 
- Quantitative Evaluation of 
quality 
- Process transparency 
- Hidden identity of bidders 
- Dual sourcing 
Contract 
Price 
- Net contract 
- Inflation indexation 
-Bear transferable  investmen 
- Net contract 
- Inflation indexation 
- Fare increase 
-Bear transferable  investment 
- fixed price (1rt year) 
- inflation indexation 
-Partial costs reimbursement 
(ferry)  
Reputation  N.A N.A -Negotiation with known supplier 
Contract 
Duration  
- 8 years 
-2 years extension option 
- 6 years 
- 2 years extension option 
- 5 or 6 years 
- 3 years Extension option 
Subcont. Agr.  N.A N.A - Consortium buying 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incentives 
for quality 
commitment 
Sales  - Revenue of new demand 
-Renegotiation through 
sale 
- Revenue of new demand 
- Renegotiation through sale 
- Flexible frequency 
 
 
N.A 
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The evaluation of quality policy in quantitative language is to be applauded in all the 3 
Cases. In fact such measurements provide accountability of decision making as anyone can 
easily identify the winner of the tendering through them (…..). They can also discourage 
corruption when coupled with transparency (sealed bid, public opening, and no private 
contacts). Quantitative evaluation of quality may avoid conflict which involves substantial 
transaction costs. For the latter, one must be careful when setting in the evaluation because 
some aspect of quality cannot objectively be quantify. 
In fact how can the procurer rank objectively different bids on one quality aspect? To say 
it differently, can he objectively say that one bid is better than another on a quality aspect? 
For example if one wants to evaluate how the intervention operations (evacuation lead 
time, first cares) in Case 3, is it objectively possible to say that one bidder is more effective 
than another based on the description? The same question can be asked for facility 
cleaning in Case 2. The procurer may base on the frequency of cleaning suggested by 
bidders to decide the best bid. However a cleaned facility may be explained by the material 
used (soap) or other aspects difficult to measure objectively.  
In definitive quality is objectively not easy to be measured quantitatively. Therefore its 
evaluation can be subjective, and so favouritism or corruption may occur from such 
evaluation. Di Tella and Bliss (1997) have pointed out such paradox when measures to 
fight against corruption end up finally in corruption. 
 
The specification of new brand ferry in Case 1 can weaken relatively short contract 
duration as quality incentive. In fact, it usually takes more than 10 years to recoup such 
investments (ferry). For that reason a risk premium can be included in the bid price by 
bidders. But because of competition, some bidders may underestimate the risk and submit 
low price. In that case there is a high probability to choose an overoptimist bidder as the 
award is the lowest cost who may be a hit-and-run firm.  
Besides, moral hazard can appear if there are few alternatives to redeploy the asset (ferry 
investments can be relation specific asset) in the case of non renewal of licence after the 10 
years. But as there is a risk on contract renewal, the contractor can deter quality to save 
cost as a counterparty of the recoup to be sunk in the case of non contract renewal. 
One may claim that it can exist a lease market for ferry in which the firm buying a new 
ferry can redeploy it. Indeed, but it must not be ignored that a profit seeker may not be 
willing to lease a new brand ferry to competitor.  
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In Case 2 for example, the duration incentive (extension option) has high probability to be 
successful. The reason is that the contractor has the possibility to lease easily a used fast 
boat in the lease market (as new brand is not required in the bid). That can lower the 
investments costs for fast boat, and thus mitigate the issue of recoup time. As well, the 
short duration can avoid the public procurer being tied in specific relationship. 
Consequently the procurer will be able to switch poor quality contractor in such case.  
The same can be achieved in Case 3 as well (lease market for ambulanse equipment and 
personal).  
There is another issue raised by short contract duration. It is the question of market entry 
for entrants. In fact short contract duration is favourable for existing engines park (with 
respect to recoup), namely for bidders already in business. Short duration can be said to 
kill competition. And so may do long contract duration, as we explained earlier that long 
contract duration may fasten in specific relationship the public buyer and increase the risk 
of high opportunism. The choice of contract duration must then takes into account the 
amount of investments and the potential of moral hazard. 
 
There is no doubt about the significant benefits of subcontract coordination (consortium 
buying) between authority and contractor on quality expectation. However such agreement 
can make it difficult to switch one contract to another supplier. The explanation must be 
found in the fact that common buying can force public procurer and current contractor to 
share the same supplier. The litterature in purchasing demonstrated that frequent buying 
involves social exchanges between buyer and seller, which in term ends up in specific 
relationship (Heide, 1994; Buvik et al., 2001). In other words authority and contractor 
together can be binded in specific relationship with the same supplier. As specific relation 
is difficult to break, the current supplier can keep the same supplier even if its contract is 
not renewed with the public buyer. 
So in that case, the next contractor (when the contract of the current is not renewed) and 
the previous one can be forced to share the same supplier. The reason is that the public 
authority can as well keep the mentioned supplier so as to continue his consortium buying 
policy every time there is a new contractor. In definitve, the two competitors may be 
delivered from the same supplier.  
It has been shown how such connection known as network connection or supply chains 
overlapping (linkage of different supply chain) may damage competitivity (when two 
competitors share the same supplier).  
 55 
 
The self report mechanism binded to technological monitoring tools in Cases 1 and 2 must 
be applauded. The two mechanisms help the TD to avoid the costs that will incurred (for 
monitoring, performance record data analysis, auditing work as it is done in Case 3). Also 
the monitoring possibility given to users (decibel system) can boost quality expectation. In 
fact, as users can observe quality in daily usage they provide an effective monitoring tools 
(without any cost for authority).  
However it can be a doubt on trust and objectivity of users’ report of poor quality. For 
example judgement on courtesy of personal (a part of quality in Case 1 and 2) can be 
subjective. One user can appreciate positively personal’s courtesy while another can see  
that personal not polite.  
The same subjectivity of users’ judgement can happen if we considered the tidiness aspect 
in Case 2. We shown in the related section that such element is difficult to measure. So the 
veracity and objectivity of users report (decibel system) can in many quality situations 
raises lot of discussions.  
 
In Case 3, the sanction device based on patient damage compensation seems to provide 
expected result. It may force the contractor to provide better service to patient during 
operations (first treatments during evacuation). Nevertheless, it may show some limits if 
we consider the responsiveness and timeliness aspects of quality. Patient may incur 
damage if the ambulance come late when called. But it may be difficult to verify that such 
patient damages are caused by delays in intervention.  
Moreover those quality aspects (responsiveness and timeliness) seem to be not addressed 
in the design of incentive as it is difficult to relate them to existing incentives in the bid. 
We can suggest for example monitoring mechanisms based on a common communication 
center coordinated, or operated by the public authority or a sovereign third party. Such data 
record coordination (coomunication center) binded with self report incentive (of accidents, 
delays) provided by the buyer in the bid may increase responsiveness. In fact the buyer 
will then have the possibility to determine self or through the third party the intervention 
lead time every time an emergency call is taken for control (in the case that self report is 
not trustfull). 
 
The contract price mechanism used in Case 1 may increase the risk of quality opportunism. 
In fact it put a high financial risk on the contractor since it was only the inflation which 
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was expected to be indexed. However, there is a risk that the main accounts of operation 
cost (energy price, wages) increase more than the inflation. Such risk in addition to the 
high uncertainty (financial and environmental) may involve that the contractor deters 
quality to hedge against these uncertainties. In Case 2 and 3 for example, the procurer has 
taken appropriate measures to reduce such risks. The increase of salary is covered up to 
70% directly by the authority in Case 3. In Case 2, the authority has allowed the contractor 
to charge a part of such risk to users, but the risk may still high (the maximum to be 
charged is 4% after inflation). Therefore the risk of opportunism may remain. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have tried to explore the effective quality incentives that incentive theory 
pioners have suggested in the litterature to cope with the issues of adverse selection and 
moral hazard in public contracts. Our intention was to  investigate how these theoritical 
incentives were implemented in day-to-day public procurement practices in Norway. Three 
public procurement Cases have been chosen for the purpose. The choice is explained by 
their high degree of quality uncertainty (experience goods) which makes them ideal 
candidates for moral hazard and adverse selection. 
 
In total eight incentives schemes have been pointed out in this paper. Those are screening, 
competition, contract price, reputation, contract duration, subcontracting agreements for 
coordination, monitoring, and sales incentives.  
For the isssue of adverse selection or hidden information generally present at the supplier-
selection stage of experience service contract, public procurer has the screening incentives 
as tool to face the problem. In practice various strategies are used to implement those 
incentices in practice. Some of them appear to be guarantee payment, taxes attest and HSE 
policy declaration, and competitive dialogue (competition with negotiation). Those 
strategies seem stronger in practice to discourage hit-and-run company or unserious 
suppliers from complex public contract biddings. Public authority can strenghten the 
impact of these tools by specifying objectively expected quality.  
 
Furthermore, devices such as increased competition, contract price, reputation, contract 
duration, sub-contract coordination agreements, monitoring/sanction, and sales incentives 
can be provided against hidden actions or moral hazard. However some of these incentives 
can be incompatibles to other. Explicitly public procurer should be careful when designing 
those mechanisms because some of them can hinder the other and produise undesirable 
effect.  
For example, we found that reputation incentives can be implemented through negotiation 
or selected entry. Such implementations can limit competition, thus mitigating its effect. 
They can also end up in specific relationship in which the opportunism may be high as it 
may be difficult to switch the contractor even if he supplies poor quality.  
As well, contract duration (long contract) can have negative influence on future quality 
since the competitors loosing public contracts can be out of business (without demand) for 
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long time, all of which force them into bankrupcy. Longer duration may also involve 
specific relationship which can lead to quality opportunism (Douma &Schreuder, 2002). 
However long contract duration may encourage high investments, and thus increase 
quality. The paradox created by the contract duration may be solved if one set a shorter 
contract duration with an extension option binded by quality. The idea is that short contract 
duration may discourage quality opportunism embedded in specific relationship while the 
extension option can encourage investments. 
 
 
Future research 
In this study, the objective was to explore the theoritical quality incentives suggested by 
theory pioneers, and investigate how there are implemented in practice. The observation 
we have made is that some of these incentives may hinders other.  
We suggest that further investigations should be done in order to investigate quantitatively 
the effectiveness of these quality incentives implementations. 
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